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Thank you to the active and concerned citizens of Saint Paul, Minnesota who 
were never shy about expressing their feelings about the Capital Improvement 
Budget Process. I am especially indebted to the Summit-University Planning Council 
and the residents of that district who put so much faith in me over the last few 
years. They allowed me to experiment and organize in their community and 
represent them in this process on the Streets and Utilities Task Force. Last, but not 
least I would like to thank John McCarthy at the City of Saint Paul, Professor Elliott 
Sclar, and Professor Moshe Adler. 
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Exploring Participation and Good Governance: An Analysis of St. Paul, Minnesota’s 
Capital Improvement Budget Process  
 
This project is an exercise in equity planning. Norman Krumholz and Pierre Clavel 
define equity planning as “a conscious attempt to carry out redistributive policies in 
favor of the least powerful and enhancing the avenues of participation” (Krumholz 
and Clavel 1994). Economic equity aims for fairness amongst all citizens, but takes 
into account unequal access to resources. An equitable outcome requires an 
understanding of each citizen or community’s starting point, or current status in 
society. Equality on the other hand focuses on fair treatment and process rather 
than outcomes. To illustrate this idea, the Multicultural America: Multimedia 
Encyclopedia describes Keynes’ focus on an “equality of outcomes.” Author Bill 
Kte’pi states,  
“If two children are sitting at a restaurant booth and the smaller one is 
given a booster seat to bring him to the level of the table, that is not 
equal treatment in the sense of each party being treated identically, 
but it is equitable treatment in that the outcome for each party is 
equal.” (Kte’pi 2013) 
 
The equitable distribution of resources is a normative planning goal and the 
processes that produce an equitable outcome could be seen as a governance best 
practice.  Thus the processes that lead and detract from equitable outcomes are an 
important area of study for planning research. Specific case study research can 
provide insight for practitioners and academics to critically assess the processes and 
outcomes that define their work.   
 This discussion sets the stage for a quantitative exploration of Saint Paul, 
Minnesota’s Capital Improvement Budget (CIB) Process. The CIB process allocates 
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monies from a variety of funding sources including municipal state bonds, 
Community Development Block Group (CDBG) funds, and gas tax revenues to pay 
for local infrastructure projects. This process is a relatively small part of the city’s 
budget, approximately 18% of the 2006 $536,135,830 budget (City of Saint Paul 
2006). However, the process has had a participatory mechanism since 1967 when 
the state government allowed the city to discontinue a mandated public referendum 
and replace it with a less direct participation process. It is notable that in a time of 
increased interest in local control and direct democracy that the city streamlined its 
budgeting process and made its participation less direct.  
 This analysis will focus on the outcomes of the CIB process and more 
specifically the geographic distribution of the allocated municipal funding. Analysis 
will focus on the outcomes of the participatory process so that recommendations 
can be made to improve the process and lead to more equitable outcomes.  I will 
actively try to relate this project to the larger literatures centered on governance 
best practices, participatory processes, and equity planning while focusing on the 
specific research question.  
“ How has the CIB funding been distributed geographically across the city of Saint 






To gain a deeper understanding of the Capital Improvement Budget Process 
it is important to examine the use of municipal securities to finance public 
infrastructure. Municipal securities are usually general obligation (GOs) bonds that 
are sold to provide funds for capital improvement projects, rather than funding 
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everyday governmental operations (O’Hara 2012). Issuers of GOs are required use 
their credit and taxing power for the full repayment of the bonds. Funds generated 
by taxes are usually used to repay the bonds because the financed public 
improvements are considered a public benefit. New bond issues usually require the 
approval of the issuer and state laws restrict and regulate the size and structure of 
the issues and debt (O’Hara 2012). 
Table 1.1 Issuers of Long-Term Municipal Bonds, 2000 to 2009 
 
Issuer % of Municipal Bonds 
State Authority 31.8% 
Local Authority 18.3% 
District 16.0% 
City/Town/Village 13.3% 
State Governments 10.3% 
County/Parish 6.3% 
College/University 2.5% 
Direct Issuer 1.1% 
Source Thomson Reuters (O’Hara 2012) 
State and local authorities such as transportation, economic development, 
housing or natural resource authorities issue the majority of bonds. School districts 
and city, county, and state governments also issue a large percentage of GOs. Capital 
Improvement Bonds in Saint Paul provide funding for public infrastructure and are 
issued and repaid by the city.  
Table 1.2 Major Uses of Municipal Debt, 1989 and 2009 
 




Education 15.6% 22.3% 
Transportation 8.8% 12.0% 
Health Care 12.5% 11.2% 
Water, Sewer and Gas 12.6% 10.2% 
Other 8.2% 4.9% 
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Public Power 6.7% 3.9% 
Housing 9.2% 2.5% 
Pollution Control 1.9% 1.5% 
Source: Thomson Reuters (O’Hara 2012) 
The majority of municipal securities are used to finance public 
improvements, education, and transportation. The proportion of these major 
categories has grown from 1989 to 2009. All other categories have seen a decline in 
the amount of finance from municipal securities. The CIB process funds public 
improvement, transportation, housing, and occasionally sewer projects. In small 
municipalities GOs often require approval by voter referendum. However in Saint 
Paul, the second largest city in Minnesota, a smaller participatory process is used to 
approve the allocation of GOs.  
 
The CIB Process 
 
In 1967 the Minnesota State Legislature passed a law that allowed the city of 
Saint Paul to use municipal bonds to pay for infrastructure projects without public 
referendum if a citizen’s committee is involved in the decision-making process. To 
replace the voter referendum, the city established the Capital Improvement Budget 
(CIB) with a CIB committee composed of citizens and city staff appointed by the 
mayor. State law dictates the size and composition of Saint Paul’s CIB committee. 
The process also includes a citizen task force, a non-state mandated citizen’s panel, 
which is comprised of representatives from each district council (neighborhood) of 
Saint Paul.  
The CIB process starts about six months before the task force meets when 
the city accepts project proposals. Neighborhood activists, district councils or city 
agencies submit project proposals to the planning department.  The vast majority of 
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projects are submitted by city agencies, specifically public works and the parks 
department. Projects that are potential candidates for funding are split into three 
categories: Streets and Utilities, Parks and Recreation, and Economic and 
Residential Development. Each category has its own citizen task force.  
The task force, comprised of neighborhood-level volunteers and activists, ranks 
each project on perceived city need and the CIB committee then further discusses 
the projects and makes sure that all projects fit within the predetermined budget. 
The task force and the CIB committee do not make the final decision on the 
allocation of municipal funding; rather the mayor and the city council make the final 
decision.  Next the mayor presents his CIB budget selections in a series of public 
hearings. The mayor’s budget sometimes includes projects that were not given 
priority by the citizen task force’s rankings. Finally, the city council votes on the 
mayor’s proposed budget and can amend the project list another time.  
The projects are funded over a two-year cycle and the city’s public works 
department decides construction timelines. Occasionally projects are given CIB 
approval outside of the two-year cycle CIB process described above. This occurs 
when an outside funding source is available and the city needs to act immediately to 
secure it. In this case the new project does not go through the citizen task force, but 
still most go through the mandated CIB committee.  
The Role of the District Councils 
By eliminating a burdensome mandate for public referendum of infrastructure 
projects the city of Saint Paul could more effectively fund and construct city 
infrastructure projects. Also to consider, is the state of Minnesota’s mandate for 
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public participation through the Capital Improvement Budget (CIB) Committee and 
the city’s non-mandated citizen task force. The city of Saint Paul relies on the district 
council system for neighborhood planning and local participation. The participatory 
mechanism of the CIB process is also dependent on the district councils of Saint 
Paul. In this process the district council selects neighborhood representation for the 
task force in an informal manner.  
There are 17 district councils in Saint Paul. The district councils are an 
interesting hybrid of government and non-profit organization.  Each district council 
must be a 501-c3 non-profit entity, but their existence is mandated by the city of 
Saint Paul to provide an advisory government role. Permit, license and variance 
requests must present their plan to the affected district council’s board of directors 
or sub-committee. The district council can write a letter of approval or disapproval 
to the city’s planning commission or to help influence the decision. The planning 
commission and city council often follow the opinion of the district council, but 
sometimes their decisions disregard neighborhood opinion. 
The boundaries of the district councils follow historic neighborhood boundaries 
and are not equal in population.  For example District 5 (Payne-Phalen) contains 
10.60% of Saint Paul’s population, whereas District 16 (Summit Hill) contains only 
2.21% of the city’s population. The geographic size of each district council varies 
widely as well (MN Compass 2015). For example, District 1 (Eastview-Conway-
Battle Creek-Highwood) has a 4.4-mile north-south boundary on the city’s far 
eastside and 2.1-mile east-west boundary, whereas District 16 (Summit Hill) is two 
miles east-west and 0.5 miles north-south. District council boundaries differ from 
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the 7 city council ward boundaries, which are equal in population proportion and do 
not follow neighborhood boundaries as closely. Evidently, the district councils have 
different demographic profiles and infrastructural needs that require a developed 
equity lens in the city’s planning practice.  
 
Literature Review 
As discussed earlier, this project is rooted in the tradition of equity planning. 
The study of equity requires a deep understanding of power relations and how the 
concept of power creates and reinforces planning systems. Equity challenges 
existing distributions of power and resources, thus the project is framed within the 
larger literature of communicative planning theory. The work of Innes, Habermas, 
Flyvbjerg, and Krumholz will be discussed. Krumholz’s work in Cleveland is 
especially important to this project because under his guidance the city specifically 
focused on planning with an equity lens.  
 Equity planning and communicative theory emerged alongside the 
movement to decentralize decision-making and government in the 1960s and 
1970s.  These movements were in response to the top-down, rationalist planning of 
the post-war period that devastated the traditional urban fabric of the American 
inner city. In many cities, such as Atlanta, Boston and Los Angeles, new advisory 
levels of government were created on the neighborhood level in response to such 
calls for redistribution of power to the local level (Gittel 1980). However, many of 
these neighborhood-level governments, including Saint Paul’s district council 
system, have been deemed ineffective and I will discuss Judith Tendler’s analysis of 
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the dynamic between the local, civic level and higher governmental levels. One such 
decentralization technique that has been recently implemented is participatory 
budgeting. Participatory budgeting is discussed in this section and could prove to be 
a useful alternative to Saint Paul’s CIB process. 
.  
Communicative Planning Theory 
The study of institution design, process, governance, deliberation, and ethics 
are within the emerging planning field of communicative theory. Theorists and 
practitioners who study communicative practice document what planners do and 
reflect critically on the practice. In Planning Theory’s Emerging Paradigm: 
Communicative Action and Interactive Practice, Judith Innes dichotomizes the 
communicative thinkers with “old-school” systematic thinkers. Systematic thinkers 
ascribe to the paradigm of rationality and view the planner as a politically neutral 
technocrat. Communicative thinkers use current practice as raw material to study 
the field of planning and believe that planners are embedded in politics, public 
decision-making, and the larger community (Innes 1990). Communicative theory 
emerged out of a discontent and perceived inconsistency within positivist and 
rationalist planning. Innes cites Rittel and Webber’s discussion of “wicked 
problems,” Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, and Rivlin’s work on the limitations of 
cost-benefit analysis and other analytic planning methods.  (Innes 1990) 
 As communicative action theorists (Innes 1990, Forester 1992, Flyvbjerg 
1998, Healey 1995) link planning to the political and social realities of city 
governance their work is grounded in Jurgen Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action.  Habermas argues that it is appropriate to be motivated by practical interest 
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in political and social life and that this motivation leads to knowledge. In his theory 
he states that one must first challenge assumptions to discover the power relations 
hidden within. Habermas also advocates for self-reflection to uncover one’s own 
biases within and praxis. Praxis is the idea that when theory and practice intertwine 
both become stronger and new knowledge is created (Habermas 1981). This 
concept is especially valuable to practitioners looking to create change. Habermas 
also believes that a great amount of knowledge can come from discourse and 
communication itself. Discourse can further illuminate the intricacies of a situation 
and if it is designed properly can help uncover rationalization that reinforces 
existing power structures (Habermas 1981, Innes 1990). However, the political 
reality might make consensus impossible and make discourse moot.  
 Bent Flyvbjerg challenges Habermas’ emphasis on discourse and democracy 
in Rationality and Power. From his experience within the planning department of 
Aalborg, Denmark he found that power created and manipulated knowledge for a 
predetermined benefit. Flyvbjerg believes that planners need to focus their practice 
on understanding this distribution and concentration of power. As planners we may 
want to increase democracy’s role in decision-making, but we must understand that 
democracy is just one element among many elements that guide decision-making. 
Flyvbjerg studies power in a case-study model because he finds rationality is 
context-specific and the modus operandi changes from location to location. Because 
of this reality he recommends that planners study “what is actually done” rather 
than “what should be done” (Flyvbjerg 1998). By studying process and outcomes 
Flyvbjerg’s logic is clearly within communicative theory.  
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  Norman Krumholz began his planning career during the turmoil of the civil 
rights era of the 1960s (Krumholz and Forester 1990, Krumholz and Clavel 1994).  
He found that rational and neutral planning techniques of the post-war period were 
irrelevant to the highly political urban issues of race relations and poverty. 
Traditional planning was reinforcing inequality and the distribution of power. 
Krumholz specifically focused his planning practice on the needs of the poor. 
Krumholz describes the processes and outcomes of his work in Cleveland in Making 
Equity Planning Work. Like Flyvbjerg, Krumholz worked within the context-specific 
reality of a political economy to become an effective equity planner. He understood 
that his practice alone could not change the political economy, but could produce 
“tangible benefits for their clientele” (Krumholz and Forester 1990). The research 
presented by the scholars of communicative planning theory has strong lessons for 
practitioners looking to create better systems of governance. 
Decentralization and Good Governance 
The implementation of governmental processes and their relation to citizen 
participation is studied in Judith Tendler’s research on local government practices 
in the Global South. She found that the path to improved local governance was much 
more complicated than commonly thought (Tendler 1997). Dominant discourse on 
decentralized government practices assumes a one-way causality where a good, 
responsive government is dependent on the existence of a strong, developed civil 
society. This dynamic is often depicted as a civil society-led struggle with 
government over increased accountability. However, Tendler found in her study of 
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governmental reform in a Ceara, a poor state in Brazil’s northeast, that the dynamic 
was more complex (Tendler 1997).  
The result in the Brazilian case study was a three-way dynamic with an 
activist state government, an ineffective municipal government, and civil society. 
The strong state government took certain powers and tasks away from the 
municipal governments and devolved others to them. Furthermore, the state 
assisted in the creation and organizing of local civic organizations. Once organized, 
these civic groups then began to pressure the state and municipal governments in 
the assumed traditional model.  Tendler concludes that the increase in civic 
participation and improved municipal government was primarily a result of the 
increased role of the state government rather than its retreat and the devolution of 
power (Tendler 1997). 
Similarly Marilyn Gittell found in her study of citizen participation in 
educational policymaking of Atlanta, Boston and Los Angeles that civil society is not 
effective at pushing government towards accountability. In the Limits of Public 
Participation, Gittell finds that economic class, political culture and an equitable 
distribution of resources and power are the most determinant factors to 
participation. Community organizations defined as low-income were more likely to 
be focused on service provision rather than political advocacy, thus limiting their 
role in policymaking and gains for political power. Gittell then connects political 
equity as a necessity towards securing economic equity. Middle-income community 
organizations were found to be the most political active, whereas the underclass 
was found to participate the least (Gittell 1990).  
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The changing roles of community organizations from advocacy-based to 
service-based coincided with political movements of decentralization. In the 1960s 
the expansion of social service programs aimed to improve the lives of the urban 
poor and to spark reinvestment in urban areas was coupled with increased local 
control. A redistribution of power by the federal government required these new 
social programs to have public participation components. Going one step further, 
local governments established community-level governmental bodies. Boston 
established Little City Halls and Atlanta established Neighborhood Planning Units in 
1975 (Gittell 1990, Hunter 1980). In theory these bodies would increase local 
control and provide more responsive service delivery to neighborhoods. In practice, 
the LCHs and NPUs had limited to no decision-making power, were less used by low-
income populations than middle-income populations, and, in the case of Boston 
were essentially extensions of the mayor’s power into the neighborhood (Gittell 
1990, Hunter 1980). Saint Paul’s district council system, founded in 1967, 
functioned similarly to Atlanta’s NPUs by providing limited, advisory decision-
making power to residents.  In A Backyard Revolution, author Harry Boyte describes 
this era of decentralization as “a groundswell movement of citizens calling for a 
return of political and economic power to the local level” (Boyte 1980). However, in 
practice and implementation local control and decentralization does not necessarily 
equate to “good” governance.  
Norman Krumholz found that planners could play an integral role in creating 
effective neighborhood organizations and local governmental units. Cleveland’s 
planning department began supporting the neighborhood organizations with 
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analytic tools and visioning. This created a reciprocal relationship where local 
activists would help planners by volunteering their time to assist the department on 
local projects and provide information on what infrastructure was in most need of 
repair. With this information, city planning could collaborate with other agencies to 
provide more efficient public services to the neighborhoods (Krumholz and Forester 
1990). Good governance in this instance was created by a progressive city agency 
pressuring both civic society and other public agencies through their affective and 
efficient work.  
Participatory Budgeting 
Participatory budgeting is a good governance technique that could become 
an replicable model for the city of Saint Paul. Saint Paul’s Capital Improvement 
Budget Process could be considered a participatory budgeting mechanism. Citizens 
have the opportunity to influence budgetary decisions through participation in the 
citizen task force or the CIB committee. However, the task force and committee play 
an advisory role and do not directly deicide the city’s allocation of state bonding 
bills for infrastructure projects. Truer participatory budgeting processes were said 
to have started in the 1980s in Brazil where local socialist governments enabled 
citizens to allocate the municipal budget. Since, similar participatory budget 
processes have spread across the globe and the World Bank became the major 
distributor of the mechanism.  
In A Brief Reflection on the Brazilian Participatory Experience, a synopsis of Vera 
Pereira Coelho study of public deliberation in Brazil’s participatory spaces, Coelho 
found that the initial intentions of participatory governmental practices were lost 
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because of poor process and embedded political interests (Coehlo 2014). Since its 
beginnings in Porto Alegre in 1989, participatory budgeting has spread to 400 of the 
5,507 Brazilian municipalities. Also, more than 28,000 policy councils have been 
established across the country where, in theory, citizens can help guide policy on 
varied subjects like healthcare, education and other social services. The hopeful 
researcher assumed that participatory mechanisms would make policies more likely 
meet the needs of citizens, increase accountability of the state, “limit the predatory 
behavior” of the elite classes, encourage the most marginalized people to participate 
in government, and the opportunity for policy to be based on a citizens personal 
experience rather than external expertise (Coehlo 2014). On the ground, Coehlo 
found many instances of participatory spaces without lively meetings or debate, 
poorly facilitated processes, and no strong evidence that marginalized citizens were 
included. Coehlo was hard-pressed to find examples of innovative public policies 
being generated by citizen representatives or that the discussions were changing 
the policy process. Overall she found that the studied participatory processes have 
improved or grown since their inception in 1989 partly due to public officials’ desire 
to maintain the status quo. 
 Since 2002 the World Bank has replaced leftist South American governments 
as the main initiator of participatory budgeting processes around the world. The 
World Bank used the same reasoning as the South American Left to call support for 
participatory budgeting. The stated reasons included a democratization of local 
government, increased transparency, a reduction in clientelism and corruption, the 
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inclusion of poor and marginalized populations into decision making processes, and 
an extension of public services to underserved areas (Goldfrank 2012).  
Peru, where the World Bank has initiated more participatory-budget projects 
than anywhere else, has replaced Brazil as the country with the most participatory-
budgeting programs. The Peruvian government now mandates that all sub-national 
governments use participatory budgeting. Results in Peru are varied and the 
shortcomings that Coehlo found in Brazil can be found in Peru, but results are 
improving. In Albania, World Bank-supported participatory budgeting pilot projects 
were found to mobilize marginalized Roma populations. The pilot projects have 
become self-sustaining and have spread to other Albanian cities without World 
Bank support (Goldfrank 2012). The variation in outcome is affected by the initial 
design of the program and the economic, social and political conditions of the 
locality. Such conditions include the strength of local civic organizations, political 
actors opposed to participatory budgeting because of a perceived loss of power and 
the bureaucratic competence of public officials and administrators (Goldfrank 2012, 
Wampler 2012).  
 North American cities have begun to adopt participatory budgeting practices. 
In 2011, four of New York City’s council members initiated participatory budgeting 
in their districts. This set up a mechanism for citizens to allocate a portion of the 
councilmember’s capital discretionary funds. In the 2014-2015 budgetary cycle 
twenty-four council districts participated in the budget process (Participatory 
Budgeting Project 2014). Project categories included school and education, housing, 
parks and recreation, public health and environment, community facilities, public 
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safety, and transit, streets and sidewalks. Examples of funded projects include 
pedestrian countdown clocks, a green roof at a public library, security cameras at 
public housing, and new technology for public school classrooms (Participatory 
Budgeting Project 2014). The diffusion of participatory budgeting had diverse 
implementation by both local progressives and global institutions. 
Methodology 
 
To determine how funding allocated by the Capital Improvement Budget 
Process between 1990-2005 has been geographically distributed across Saint Paul a 
rigorous methodology was conducted. The methodology included both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis. Quantitative analysis was used to determine four key 
findings. First, I explored type of project, categorized by geographic distribution of 
funding, and how many of those project types were funded per funding year. The 
second key finding was the proportion of funding by project type per funding year. 
Third, I examined district council-specific funding and determined the proportion of 
funding received per district council per funding year. This was compared to the 
proportion of population of each district council compared to the population of the 
city. The fourth finding was to determine if funding was allocated to Racially 
Concentrated Areas of Poverty (RCAP) within district councils. The quantitative 
analysis utilized municipal budget books, Census data, Social Explorer, Google Maps, 
demographic data from the Wilder Foundation, a local non-profit, Metropolitan 
Council reports, Microsoft Excel and ArcGIS.  
Qualitative analysis was completed to add context to the quantitative 
analysis. Qualitative methods included expert interviews with CIB citizen task force 
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members, CIB Committee members, district council staff and city staff. Historical 
archival research was also conducted at the Minnesota Historical Society library. 
Newspaper articles from the Highland Villager and Pioneer Press were collected to 
determine public sentiment for the CIB process. Electoral ballots before the 
implementation of the CIB process in 1969 were also obtained to examine how the 
bonding bill process has changed. However, the findings and analysis in the project 
is almost purely quantitative in nature.  
In the winter of 2014 and 2015 two site visits to Saint Paul, Minnesota were 
taken to obtain data pertinent to the analysis of the city’s CIB Process. During the 
first trip, time was spent in the city of Saint Paul’s budget department library where 
the old budget books were kept. These files were not digitalized so photographs of 
each page of CIB budget information were taken. The budget sheets were than 
transferred to Microsoft Excel so that the data could be analyzed and brought into 
GIS. Data was collected from 1984-2005. However in this study only the data from 
1990-2005 was used because of the time consuming nature of the data collection 
and digitalization process. More recent (2006-2014) data was recently provided by 
the city of Saint Paul, but it was not collected in time to be analyzed for this study.  
Each photograph was manually entered into Excel due to the varying sizes of 
text, page orientation, and spreadsheet layout. Software that transfers text from 
digital photographs to Microsoft Office programs could not be utilized. Thus only 
necessary information including project code, project title, project submissions, CIB 
Committee recommendations, Mayor’s proposed budgets, and the City Council 
Adopted Budgets were included. However not every year included all of this 
 20 
information. Between 1996 and 1999 the Mayor’s proposed CIB budget was the 
most final version of the budget available and thus this needs to be considered 
during analysis. An address, district council, and project type were later researched 
and added manually. 
All projects were then categorized into three project types. Type A projects 
are neighborhood-specific projects completely located within one district council. 
An example of a Type A project is funding allocated for the renovation of “Battle 
Creek Community Recreation Center” because the project is situated completely 
within one district. Type B projects are projects that are within multiple district 
councils, but can still be geographically located. For example the “White 
Bear/Minnehaha Intersection Improvements” are a Type B project because this 
intersection is the border of two district councils. Other Type B projects that are 
corridor-based like the “University Avenue Central Corridor” are adjacent to 
multiple district councils and thus it cannot be assumed that funding was 
distributed evenly to each district council. Type B projects are excluded from the 
analysis of funding by district council. Type C projects are projects whose funding 
are dispersed throughout the city and cannot be geographically located from 
archival data from the CIB process. For example funding for “Local Street, Alley, 
Sewer, and Lighting Improvements” can be spent anywhere across the city and the 
geographic location of spending cannot be determined.  
Data was analyzed using the pivot table function in Excel. First a pivot table 
was created for every funding cycle year and the number of projects per project 
type was found. Then the amount of funding for each year for each project type was 
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determined. The proportion of funding per two-year cycle was found by finding the 
sum of each year and dividing by the total funding for that cycle. Further analysis 
within Type A projects was done to find the proportion of funding per cycle per 
district council. The average funding allocated per district council for the sixteen-
year period between 1990-2005 was then determined. Lastly, the proportion of 
funding by district council was then compared to proportion of population by 
district council. This method was used in similar reports about Philadelphia, the 
state of New York, and Anaheim (Adams 1988, Rockefeller Institute 2011, City of 
Anaheim 2013).  
The equity analysis was then completed on a more granular level to 
determine if funding was distributed within Racially Concentrated Areas of Poverty 
(RCAP). First it was necessary to determine where RCAPs were located within Saint 
Paul. The Metropolitan Council’s report on racial disparities within the region 
located RCAP census tracts and visualized the growth of these areas within the 
metropolitan region between 1990 and 2010 (Metropolitan Council 2014).  The 
Metropolitan Council’s analysis of RCAPs was trusted and the same census tracts 
were used in this equity analysis.  
 For the study of funding in RCAPs Type A projects, those completely within a 
district council were further divided into those that are situated at one individual 
address or a larger project that was situated within a single census tract. The 
addresses were then geocoded in ArcGIS and the amount of funding per census tract 
was determined from the attribute table. Each project was checked with a census 
tract and street map provided by Social Explorer to determine if the project was 
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located with a single census tract. For example, the address of “Battle Creek 
Community Recreation Area” was geocoded to its census tract easily.  A project like 
the  “Snelling Avenue Streetscape,” is completely within District 11, but is not 
located at a single address. However after an examination of the census tract map it 
was found that all of Snelling Avenue in District 11 is located within a single census 
tract. An approximate address within that census tract was selected and coded with 
that project. Some Type A projects could not be coded with an address because 
some corridor projects were situated in multiple census tracts.  
Analysis 
 
This analysis will examine the distribution of funding allocated through the 
Capital Improvement Budget process on three different scales. First, the funded 
projects will be split into three broad categories. The categories will explain if the 
funding is district-council specific, spent across multiple district councils or 
citywide. Second, district council specific spending will be examined to determine 
how much funding was spent per district. Thirdly, district council-specific funding 
that can be attached to a specific address will be examined to determine how much 
funding was allocated per census tract. From this, the amount of funding allocated to 
Racially Concentrated Areas of Poverty (RCAP) can be explained.  
Project Categorization 
After following the quantitative methodology presented in the last section it 
was found that the vast majority of projects funded through the city of Saint Paul’s 
Capital Improvement Budget Process were Type A projects (Figure 1.1). However 
these neighborhood-specific projects did not receive the majority of funding. The 
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vast majority of funding went to Type C projects (Figure 1.2). Type C projects cannot 
be located geographically because the funding can be spent anywhere in the city. 
Overall this means it is very hard to determine where the majority of funding 
allocated by the CIB Process. Type C Projects such as the “Citywide Tree Planting 
Program” and the “Mixed-Income 5000 Housing Fund” would require an entirely 
different methodology and data source to find out how funding is geographically 
allocated across the city.  Type C projects could be seen as less transparent 
allocations of money because it is not clear where they money will be spent when 
the funding is allocated during the CIB Process. 
Figure 1.1 Count of Projects by Type 1990-2005 
sources: City of Saint Paul Budget Books 1990-2005 
 








90-91 92-93 94-95 96-97 98-99 00-01 02-03 04-05
# of Projects 
Funding Cycle Year 








source: City of Saint Paul Budget Books 1990-2005 
 
The proportion of funding for project types has remained relatively 
consistent over the sixteen-year period. The main change was a peak during the mid 
to late 1990s when Type B projects were receiving a larger proportion of CIB-
allocated funding. This was mostly due to the allocation of funding for a new 
Wabasha Street Bridge over the Mississippi River connecting District 17 
(Downtown) to District 3 (Westside) and Phalen Boulevard, a brownfield 
redevelopment plan on the city’s Eastside.  These large public infrastructure 
projects captured some of the Type C funding in 1996-1997 and 1998-1999 funding 
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Figure 1.3 Total Percentage of Allocated Funding by Project Type 
 
source: City of Saint Paul budget books 1990-2005 
 
District Council Level Analysis 
 
Among “Type A Projects” certain district councils have been awarded more funding 
than others through the CIB process. District councils that have been repeatedly 
allocated more funding include Downtown (District 17), Westside (District 3), and 
Dayton’s Bluff (District 4). Downtown has been one of the top two recipients of CIB 
funding 9 out of the 16 funding years, the most of any district council. The Westside 
has been a top two recipient of funding 7 times and Dayton’s Bluff has been a top 
two recipient 5 times. Downtown and the Westside have received some funding 
every year of the studied period, whereas Dayton’s Bluff did not receive any funding 
in 2001 and 2005. (see Table 1.4) 
Many district councils repeatedly receive no neighborhood-specific funding 
allocated through the CIB process. Macalester-Groveland (District 14) received no 
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9 out of 16 years, Midway (District 11) 8 out of 16 years, St. Anthony Park (District 
12) 7 out of 16 years, Como (District 10) received no funding 7 out of 16 years, and 
Eastview-Conway-Battle Creek-Highwood (District 1) also received no funding 7 out 
of 16 years. Furthermore, certain funding years concentrated CIB funds to fewer 
district councils than average. In 1995, 9 district councils did not receive any 
funding. In 1999 and 2005 8 district councils did not receive any funding. In 2000 
only 1 district council did not receive any funding and in 1996, 1998, and 2002 only 
two district councils received no funding at all.  (see Table 1.4) 
 Comparing the proportion of funding allocated to each district council to the 
proportion of population of each district council it is clear that there is a disparity 
between the proportions. Funding in the 1990s was more evenly distributed across 
the district councils. The districts on the city’s Eastside (D1, D2, D4, D5) contain 
many of the city’s RCAP census tracts. In the 1990s, three out of four of these 
districts received a larger proportion of funding compared to their proportion of the 
city’s population. This suggests a somewhat progressive and equitable distribution 
of CIB funding to areas of need. Other districts that contain RCAP census tracts 
include D3, D6, D7, D8 and D13. Like some of the Eastside districts, District 3 and 
District 13 also had a funding proportion larger than their proportion of population. 
District 6, 7, and 8’s funding proportion was less than their population proportion 
demonstrating that even though funding in the 1990s was distributed more evenly 
it still was not an equitable distribution of resources. The difference between the 
population proportion and the funding proportion in the 1990s was greatest in 
Downtown (District 17), which received 13.80% of the population, but only 1.52% 
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of the population. In the next decade even more funding was allocated to Downtown 
(District 17), as noted by the higher proportion of total funding.  
Between 2000-2005 funding allocated for the majority of district councils 
that contain RCAP census tracts declined. Three out of the four districts on the city’s 
Eastside (D1, D4, D5) received less funding between 2000-2005 compared to the 
previous decade. District 1,2, and 5 received less funding than their population. 
Other districts containing RCAPs including D6, D7, D9 and D13 also had funding 
proportions less than their population proportion. The Westside (D3), an RCAP 
district, received more funding than its population proportion and the second most 
of any district. CIB funding nearly dried up in wealthier district councils. D11, D12, 
D13, D14, and D16 all received less than one percent of total funding.  
Table 1.3 Comparison of Population Proportion and Funding Proportion for 







1999 % of total 1990 pop 2000 Pop 
% of funding 
2000-2005 % of total 2000 pop 
1 18,968 8.02% 6.97% 20,063 2.00% 6.99% 
2 24,475 4.68% 8.99% 26,566 7.00% 9.25% 
3 15,207 15.37% 5.59% 16,133 19.83% 5.62% 
4 15,442 10.08% 5.67% 17,758 9.73% 6.19% 
5 26,692 10.91% 9.80% 31,531 4.85% 10.98% 
6 19,768 3.01% 7.26% 20,657 6.72% 7.20% 
7 14,540 2.09% 5.34% 17,248 2.46% 6.01% 
8 18,249 3.18% 6.70% 18,192 5.65% 6.34% 
9 10,724 2.69% 3.94% 10,412 1.93% 3.63% 
10 16,495 0.83% 6.06% 16,406 5.33% 5.71% 
11 11,815 1.77% 4.34% 11,822 0.84% 4.12% 
12 6,656 3.70% 2.44% 6,076 0.68% 2.12% 
13 18,401 10.31% 6.76% 18,803 0.18% 6.55% 
14 20,416 0.32% 7.50% 19,722 0.60% 6.87% 
15 23,037 5.13% 8.46% 23,202 3.89% 8.08% 
16 7,210 4.11% 2.65% 6,741 0.01% 2.35% 
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17 4,140 13.80% 1.52% 5,743 28.30% 2.00% 
Source: City of Saint Paul Budget Books 1990-2005, Wilder Foundation MN Compass Neighborhood Profiles 
 
Census Tract Level Analysis 
 Similar trends emerge when examining the geographic distribution of 
funding on the census tract level however it becomes clearer which areas within the 
district council boundaries received funding. Between 1990-1999 the census tract 
that received the most funding was in the city’s Westside (District 3). The large 
census tract received 13.49% of CIB funding in the 1990s. The tract is a RCAP and is 
the historical center of the city’s Hispanic population. The tract contains large 
industrial areas including the city’s regional airport and the barge port on the 
Mississippi River. The tract also contains the only access to Downtown from the 
Westside with the three major bridges.  
 The census tract that contains the majority of Downtown (District 17) 
received 13.41% of the funding between 1990 and 1999. This census tract is the 
principal center of employment and the second densest employment center in the 
metropolitan area. The vast majority of tourism accommodations, entertainment, 
and sites are also located within the downtown census tract. However the census 
tract is the least populated census tract in Saint Paul according to the 1990 US 
Census.  
 25 census tracts in Saint Paul did not receive any CIB funding between 1990 
and 1999. Four of these census tracts were RCAP tracts in the Frogtown (District 7) 
and Summit-University (District 8) neighborhoods. The tracts contain the majority 
of the city’s African-American population and also a large portion of the city’s Asian 
population. Large swaths of census tracts in wealthier, majority white district 
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councils like Macalester-Groveland (District 15), Highland (District 15), and Summit 
Hill (District 16) also did not receive funding. The trends found in the 1990s 
intensify between 2000-2005.  
 Between 2000 and 2005, 32 census tracts did not receive any CIB funding. 
This is an increase of 7 census tracts from 1990-1999. The number of Racial 
Concentrated Areas of Poverty also grew during this time period, increasing to 12 
census tracts from 9 tracts in the 1990s. Between 2000 and 2005, 8 RCAP tracts did 
not receive any CIB funding. This trend shows a concentrating of resource allocation 
in Downtown (District 17) and Westside (District 3). In this period, the Downtown 
census tract was allocated the most funding and received 29.82% of funding. The 
RCAP on the Westside (District 3) received 19.69% of CIB funding. 
The analysis of historical CIB funding budgets from 1990-2005 revealed 
numerous trends. First the majority of CIB funding is allocated for projects that can 
be spent citywide (Type C Projects) and thus is impossible to tell where this money 
was spent solely from CIB budgets. Of projects that were allocated to district council 
specific projects the majority of funding was allocated to Downtown (District 17) 
and the Westside (District 3).  On the census tract level two census tracts within 
these districts were allocated the majority of funding. The remaining census tracts 
in the city traded off who received funding and who did not receive funding. 
However the number of census tracts that did not receive any funding increased, as 




Figure 1.4 Proportion of Funding by District Council per Year 1990-2005 
 
source: City of Saint Paul Budget Books 1990-2005
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Table 1.4 Proportion of Funding Allocated to District Councils 1990-2005,
D
C 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1 6.62% 0.82% 5.16% 23.61% 0.00% 0.00% 5.67% 0.00% 3.79% 20.48% 6.14% 0.00% 0.00% 4.95% 0.00% 0.00% 
2 5.06% 12.98% 0.00% 9.97% 0.00% 0.00% 0.34% 19.42% 3.66% 0.00% 15.71% 0.29% 3.25% 0.00% 12.38% 8.33% 
3 3.87% 11.49% 20.91% 27.77% 44.34% 38.72% 13.74% 3.35% 4.21% 0.00% 0.96% 1.29% 18.51% 31.40% 47.88% 12.83% 
4 2.43% 5.11% 0.06% 0.74% 1.12% 28.22% 11.13% 41.10% 4.29% 24.92% 18.06% 0.00% 20.50% 2.45% 5.04% 0.00% 
5 0.00% 11.76% 1.74% 1.43% 22.00% 1.60% 33.95% 5.92% 25.49% 2.22% 3.17% 18.43% 3.62% 1.93% 2.17% 2.92% 
6 6.70% 8.90% 0.00% 0.91% 0.43% 2.06% 1.48% 0.00% 4.63% 4.03% 8.97% 21.09% 3.94% 0.00% 6.70% 0.25% 
7 7.18% 3.53% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.90% 0.00% 2.73% 1.71% 5.38% 2.25% 1.30% 1.69% 1.42% 2.92% 
8 4.73% 0.00% 0.93% 0.00% 0.00% 5.70% 3.74% 3.11% 4.29% 5.78% 4.41% 4.92% 4.95% 12.80% 1.01% 8.33% 
9 9.47% 1.10% 0.00% 3.55% 3.49% 0.00% 0.00% 9.92% 3.03% 0.00% 4.02% 0.75% 3.98% 0.63% 0.00% 0.00% 
10 0.00% 0.00% 0.47% 0.00% 2.05% 0.00% 2.70% 0.00% 2.47% 0.00% 5.92% 0.00% 8.60% 4.66% 2.48% 10.24% 
11 5.74% 5.83% 0.00% 0.00% 0.43% 0.00% 1.85% 0.00% 3.24% 0.00% 3.38% 0.75% 0.32% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
12 9.34% 20.05% 0.00% 0.54% 1.80% 0.00% 0.00% 7.02% 0.00% 1.15% 1.27% 0.00% 0.00% 0.72% 1.65% 0.00% 
13 7.29% 0.35% 33.62% 23.13% 8.12% 2.68% 4.30% 2.60% 12.62% 1.04% 0.52% 0.00% 0.32% 0.00% 0.71% 0.00% 
14 0.00 % 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.92% 0.00% 0.25% 0.00% 0.47% 1.48% 0.78% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
15 0.98% 2.63% 26.47% 3.67% 4.04% 11.61% 3.49% 4.33% 0.57% 0.00% 1.16% 9.98% 0.19% 6.33% 6.39% 1.37% 
16 19.98% 2.38% 4.37% 0.30% 9.06% 0.00% 0.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 





































Are the outcomes revealed through the analysis of the allocation of CIB 
funding the desired outcomes considering that this a neighborhood-based 
participatory process? Firstly, are the representatives of the task force and CIB 
Committee in accord with the fact that the majority of funding is allocated to 
citywide projects rather than district council specific projects? This question is of 
significant importance because each representative is usually deeply embedded 
within the district council organizations. Considering solely district council specific 
projects, are the neighborhood representatives to the CIB process content with the 
amount of funding allocated to Downtown and the Westside? If the current 
outcomes are not the desired outcomes what is the way forward to create a CIB 
process that results in a more outcome equitable distribution of funding? In the 
following section I will present three conversation topics that should occur at all 17 
district councils, the monthly all-district council staff meeting, the CIB committee, 
and various city agencies. I will then present an alternative funding allocation 
guideline that has the potential to create more equitable outcomes within the CIB 
process. I will also propose new participatory mechanisms that could reinvigorate 
participation within the district councils and thus the CIB process.  
Downtown-centric Model 
The geographic distribution of the allocation of CIB funding streams between 
1990-2005 led to a Downtown-centric spending model. From a city government 
perspective this might be a fruitful strategy to funnel funding towards areas that 
produce high amounts of tax revenue. The high-density commercial district 
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produces more tax money than the surrounding areas. However downtown Saint 
Paul struggles with a high office vacancy rate, an almost complete lack of retail and a 
low residential population. The direction of funding towards this district could be 
seen as an attempt at revitalization. Downtown also has the highest employment 
population and visitor population so comparisons of proportion of funding to the 
proportion of population does not tell the whole story. Downtown is also more 
connected to transit and the regional freeway system than other districts and 
logically more Saint Paul residents could benefit from its infrastructure and public 
amenities more than other localities within the city. The increased accessibility of 
the district, economic development potential, and the higher daytime population 
should be considered in an equity model. However, downtown’s white-collar 
employment base and the users of its entertainment facilities are more likely to be 
upper middle class or middle class and this could perhaps suggest that money 
allocated for downtown is not necessarily for the “average” resident of the city. Any 
recommendation should understand the complexity of the current downtown-
centric spending model. A more equitable model would probably reduce funding 
from the levels seen between 1990-2005, but provide a much greater funding 
proportion than its population proportion.  
The high proportion of CIB funding allocated to the Westside (District 3) is 
somewhat strange and unexpected. District 3 is across the Mississippi River and 
directly south of Downtown. It includes an RCAP district, a regional park on the 
Mississippi waterfront, a large industrial zone, and a regional airport that provides 
private chartered flights for government employees and downtown executives. In 
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the late 1990s and early 2000s a large proportion of funding was allocated for flood 
protection around the regional airport. Though outside of the downtown district the 
airport could be seen as a downtown-type amenity because of its clientele. Due to its 
proximity to downtown and its waterfront location most of the funding allocated to 
the RCAP within District 3 could be considered part of the downtown-centric model. 
One caveat to this is the large amount of money allocated to the Neighborhood 
House/Wellstone Center/El Rio Vista social service and recreation complex that 
predominately serves local RCAP populations.  
A New Funding Model 
A funding model should be established to create a more equitable distribute within 
Saint Paul’s CIB Process. All district councils should be allocated some amount of 
funding every funding cycle. Each district council would be allocated a minimum 
base proportion of funding to reward the district council for participation. District 
councils that house racially Concentrated Areas of Poverty (RCAP) would receive 
funding greater than their population proportion because these areas need 
additional resources in attempt to alleviate poverty. After further analysis and 
participatory dialogue, the downtown-centric funding model would be allowed to 
continue, but to a lesser extent. The rest of the funding would not be allocated to a 
specific district council and could be matched to infrastructural needs across the 
city. Below are the recommended levels of funding in the CIB process for each of the 




Table 1.6 Proposed Funding Formula 




1 7.19% 7.19% 
2 9.82% 9.82% 
3 5.51% 5.51% 
4 5.72% 5.72% 
5 10.60% 10.60% 
6 7.79% 7.79% 
7 5.41% 5.41% 
8 5.88% 5.88% 
9 3.85% 1.00% 
10 5.49% 1.00% 
11 4.21% 1.00% 
12 2.68% 1.00% 
13** 6.09%** 1.00%** 
14 6.58% 1.00% 
15 8.63% 1.00% 
16 2.21% 1.00%` 
17 2.34% 15.90%*** 
*ACS 5 Year-Estimates 2008-2012, population analysis for the neighborhoods of Minneapolis-Saint Paul by the Wilder 
Foundation for MN Compass was used.  
 
**District 13 (Union Park) is technically an RCAP because it includes Skyline Tower, a large affordable, 500-unit affordable 
housing tower that is home to a predominately East-African immigrant population. The tower is physically isolated from the 
rest of the district and currently has no representation on District 13’s board (Melo 2015). Thus District 13 will be considered 
a higher-income district and this caveat will be further discussed in recommendations related to participatory budgeting.  
 
***The funding proportion for District 17 is a maximum funding level, rather than a minimum. A maximum was used to control 
the amount of funding that could be directed to the downtown-area rather than require that funding is spent there. I 
attempted to find a justifiable figure that was well under the amount of funding received on 2000-2005 (28.30%), but still 
much larger than the population proportion. I decided to fund District 17 at a level 50% larger than the next largest funding 
level, District 5.  
 
Three different components were considered to create the funding model. 
Firstly, a minimum base was used to create a dedicated funding level in seven 
district councils that do not contain any RCAP. One percent of funding was applied 
to these higher income districts because it is the lowest whole percentage that could 
be while still providing a dedicated funding stream. For example 1.00% of the 2004-
2005 CIB Budget of $25,025,000 would result in $250,250 in funding for capital 
projects in higher-income areas. This is approximately the funding needed for 1 
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playground rehabilitation project in 2004-2005 funding. I hypothesize that 
dedicated base funding for all district councils would have the potential to increase 
participation in the process. 
In the district councils that contain RCAP the minimum base funding would 
be the proportion of population. This is an attempt to direct funding for capital 
projects and public facilities to areas of need in the belief that high-quality public 
facilities can potentially benefit low-income populations more than high-income 
populations. An equal distribution of resources is the first step towards equity. For 
example District 5 (Payne-Phalen) would receive 10.60% of funding allocated 
through the CIB process. In 2004-2005 this would have equated to $2,652,650 in 
funding for the district. This would have been the equivalent to the reconstruction 
or repaving of two roadways or bridges in 2004-2005 dollars. The continuation, but 
de-emphasized downtown-centric model is continued in the CIB funding model 
because of the high level of transit access to the area, the concentration of 
employment, and the concentration of cultural, governmental and tourist 
attractions. The reasoning behind the maximum funding level is explained in the 
footnotes of the funding model table. The funding model dictates where 84.67% of 
district council specific funding will be spent with the goal of an equitable 
distribution of CIB funds. 15.33% of district council funding can still be directed to 
any of the 16 district councils outside of downtown for infrastructural needs.  
Changes to Participation Process 
With the establishment of dedicated district council-specific funding, changes 
to the participatory process could also increase the equity of the CIB process by 
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empowering the district council system and its participants. I recommend that the 
process shifts toward a neighborhood-based participatory budgeting where 
participants propose project ideas, work with planners and staff to determine 
feasibility, and then vote on the projects to allocate funding. This would closely 
follow the participatory budgeting model that is used in some council districts in 
New York City. Under the current participatory model all sources of funding for 
capital projects including Community Development Block Grants, County Aid, 
Municipal State Aid and Capital Improvement Bonds among others, flow trough the 
CIB Process.  
Under the new participatory budgeting model, only Capital Improvement 
Bonds, which are mandated by the state to include citizen participation, would be 
allocated through the new process. A smaller budget would give district council 
more control over a pre-determined funding level, which could increase the agency 
of the district council and neighborhood participants. The city could be more willing 
to hand over decision-making of Capital Improvement Bonds if it gained complete 
control over the other funding sources (MSA, CDBG, etc.) The city could then fund 
necessary infrastructure projects without a participatory process. For example, road 
improvements like the Kellogg Boulevard Bridge replacement and the HOV lanes on 
I-35E, which affect the whole city, but have limited benefits to neighborhoods could 
be directly funded. I imagine that the participatory budget process within the 
district councils would more likely vote to fund projects like playground 
improvements and pedestrian improvements because of the smaller budget and 
neighborhood interest in place-based projects. The state mandated CIB Committee 
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would act as “rubber stamp” to approve participatory budgeting projects. After the 
change in process further analysis would be needed to see if this lead to a more 
equitable distribution of funding. This redistribution of responsibilities between the 
municipal government and civic organization would be similar to what Judith 
Tendler found to help the creation of good governance.  
 This new process would reinvigorate the district council system by making 
participatory budgeting one of its central tasks. Participatory budgeting was found 
to attract more women, people of color and diverse age groups than more 
traditional participatory models in New York and I expect it would have a similar 
outcome in Saint Paul. This is especially relevant because a new study was just 
released in the Pioneer Press that shows the lack of participation by people of color 
in most of the district councils. It also highlights that certain district councils such as 
District 1 and 7 have changed participatory procedures to attract a more diverse 
board of directors. This highlights that changes in process can lead to changes in 
outcome. A more qualitative methodology would be needed to determine socio-
economic makeup of participants and the participant’s level of satisfaction with new 





By examining Saint Paul, Minnesota’s CIB Process through an equity lens, 
disparities in funding between neighborhoods become evident and apparent. The 
majority of funding is spent on citywide projects where the geographic distribution 
of funding cannot be easily determined. Saint Paul currently and consistently 
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directed funding towards its Central Business District (CBD) and nearby waterfront 
between 1990 and 2005. Many neighborhoods repeatedly did not receive funding 
funding cycle after funding cycle. Neighborhoods that are Racially Concentrated 
Areas of Poverty (RCAP) also received a proportion of funding well below their 
proportion of population. This is an inequitable distribution of funding allocated by 
the city’s CIB Process.  
In Norman Krumholz and Pierre Clavel’s Reinventing Cities: Equity Planners 
Tell Their Stories, the author’s point out that planning for equity is not a dream, but 
a reality for many cities across the country. However, it requires the dedication of 
city planners to focus their energy on the citizen’s with the least amount of choice 
and who are most in need. They believe that equity is a politically viable coalition 
because it brings together the working class, people of color, the elderly and young 
voters. Politicians who are focused on downtown growth without a redistributive 
equity policy should be wary of this winning coalition (Krumholz and Clavel 1994). 
Equity requires both increased redistribution and heightened participatory 
processes. The Capital Improvement Budget Process provides an opportunity to 
experiment with both redistribution (outcomes) and participation (process). If 
successful, the methodology developed here could be used to examine the rest of the 
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